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for the lawmaker to overdeter repeat o¤enders. First-time o¤enders are then
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1. Introduction
The law often sanctions repeat o¤enders more severely than rst-time o¤end-
ers.1 The literature has provided various justications for the fact that the sanc-
tion imposed on an o¤ender depends on whether he was convicted previously.2
Some authors have argued that a record of prior o¤enses provides information
about the o¤enders characteristics (e.g., a higher-than-average propensity to com-
mit crimes).3 Yet, making sanctions depend on o¤ense history may be advanta-
geous even when individuals are ex-ante identical such that there are no char-
acteristics to be learned about. As emphasized by Shavell (2004, p. 529), when
detection of a violation implies not only an immediate sanction, but also a higher
sanction for a future violation, an individual will be deterred more from commit-
ting a violation presently. In this paper, we follow Shavells (2004) insight and
further explore how penalties for repeat o¤enders should be designed when we
take their e¤ect on the deterrence of rst-time o¤enders into account.
Specically, suppose that there is an exogenously given restriction on the penal-
ties for rst-time o¤enders; i.e., there is an upper limit l which a ne for a rst-time
o¤ender must not exceed, while there is no (binding) restriction on the ne that
a repeat o¤ender has to pay.4 In each of two periods, a potential o¤ender engages
in an activity that may cause a harm h. When a harm is caused, the o¤ender is
convicted to pay a ne. If the harm is smaller than the maximum ne l, then by
setting the ne equal to the harm h in both periods the negative externality of
the activity is internalized and the rst-best (i.e., socially optimal) activity level
is implemented. Yet, if l < h, then rst-time o¤enders in the rst period are
underdeterred, given that the ne for repeat o¤enders is set equal to the harm h.
As a consequence, in general it will be optimal for the lawmaker to set the ne
for repeat o¤enders larger than h. While in the second period overdeterrence of
1For example, with regard to civil penalties in the U.S.A., Shavell (2004, ch. 22) points out
that for certain violations of the Occupational Safety and Health Act there is a maximum ne
of $7,000 for a rst o¤ense, while a repeat o¤ender may be ned $70,000.
2See Miceli (2013) for a recent literature review.
3See e.g. Rubinstein (1980), Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1991), and Chu et al. (2000).
4There may be various reasons why society does not accept larger penalties for rst-time
o¤enders. For instance, Stigler (1970, p. 528) has pointed out that a rst-time o¤ender may
have committed the o¤ense almost accidentallyand Polinsky and Shavell (1998, p. 313) argue
that considerations of fairness might constrain the sanction imposed on rst-time o¤enders but
not on repeat o¤enders.
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repeat o¤enders is ex-post ine¢ cient, the advantage of such a policy is that the
large ne for a second o¤ense has a spillover e¤ect on the rst period.5 Individuals
in the rst period are deterred not only by the (restricted) ne that they have to
pay when they cause harm as a rst-time o¤ender, but also by the prospect of
having to pay a large ne as a repeat o¤ender in the second period.
Let us now explore what happens when the restriction l that society has put
on the admissible nes for rst-time o¤enders is relaxed. At rst sight, one might
guess that the lawmaker should reduce the ex-post ine¢ cient overdeterrence of re-
peat o¤enders, because the deterrence of rst-time o¤enders can now be improved
by a larger penalty for rst o¤enses. Yet, it turns out that this is the case only
if initially the upper limit l was not very restrictive. If l was very small, then an
increase in l will actually prompt the lawmaker to further increase the ne for
repeat o¤enders; i.e., overdeterrence of second o¤enses will be further aggravated.
Intuitively, when l is very small, then a rst-time o¤ender in the second period
faces only a very small ne, which provides indirect incentives in the rst period
not to cause a harm. Now consider an increase in l, such that a rst-time o¤ender
in the second period can be more severely punished. When the ne for a repeat
o¤ender does not go up, then the indirect incentives in the rst period are reduced,
which the lawmaker may prefer to o¤set by further increasing the ne for repeat
o¤enders.6
2. The model
In each of two consecutive periods, t = 1; 2, a risk-neutral individual chooses
the level at 2 [0; 1] of a potentially harmful activity. With probability at the
individual causes a harm h > 0 in period t.7 For simplicity, assume that whenever
5Note that related spillover-of-incentives e¤ects also occur in sequential moral hazard models
with limited liability. See e.g. Schmitz (2005) and Ohlendorf and Schmitz (2012), who show how
second-period rents may act as carrot and stick for an agents rst-period e¤ort choice, such
that optimal contracts exhibit memory even though the periods are technologically independent.
Recent papers that exploit related e¤ects include e.g. Kräkel and Schöttner (2010), Tsai and
Kung (2011), Chen and Chiu (2013), and Pi (2014).
6This argument holds provided that the direct punishment in the rst period is still rather
small, which is the case for relatively small values of the upper limit l.
7It is straightforward to generalize the model to the case in which a may be larger than 1,
provided that the probability p(a) with which a harm is caused is strictly convex. When p(a)
is strictly concave, in general the problem is no longer well-behaved; yet, one can construct
2
a harm is caused, the individual is convicted to pay a ne.8 The individuals
private benet from pursuing the activity is b(a) : [0; 1] ! R with b0(a) > 0,
b00(a) < 0, lima!0 b0(a) =1 and lima!1 b0(a) = 0.
Let y 2 f0; 1g denote the individuals o¤ense history at the beginning of period
t = 2. If y = 1, then the individual is pre-convicted because he caused a harm
h in period t = 1. If y = 0, the individual has a clean slate. In period t = 0
the lawmaker commits to a constitution, in particular stipulating the (nite) ne
Ft  0 to be paid by an individual in period t if he causes a harm. While the
ne in period t = 2 may condition on the individuals o¤ense history, F2 = F2(y),
the lawmaker is not allowed to discriminate according to whether a rst o¤ense
was committed in t = 1 or t = 2.9 Thus, F1 = F2(0)  F 0 and F2(1)  F 1.
Moreover, while there is no (binding) restriction regarding the punishment F 1 of
a repeat o¤ender, by social convention punishment of a rst-time o¤ender must
not be overly drastic, F 0  l, where l  0.
If the activity level in each period were directly enforceable, then the lawmaker
would implement the activity levels that maximize the expected social surplus
S(a1) + S(a2), where
S(at) = b(at)  h  at: (1)
Thus, the rst-best solution is given by a1 = a2 = aFB > 0, where aFB is implicitly
characterized by b0(aFB) = h.
3. The Analysis
In period t = 2, an individual with o¤ense history y 2 f0; 1g chooses the
activity level a2(F y) = argmaxa22[0;1] U(a2;F
y), where
U(a;F ) = b(a)  F  a (2)
denotes an individuals expected utility from activity level a when facing ne F in
case of a harm. The second-period activity level that is optimal for the individual
satises
b0(a2(F y)) = F y (3)
examples with a 2 [0;1) such that our main insights still hold. Hence, the upper bound on a
is not crucial.
8Throughout, we suppose that the individual has su¢ cient wealth to pay the ne.
9Qualitatively similar results hold in the case in which a rst-time o¤ender may face di¤erent
nes in the two periods and there is an exogenous restriction on nes in the rst period only.
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with da2(F y)=dF y = 1=b00(a2(F y)) < 0; i.e., the higher the ne, the lower the
individuals optimal activity level. Note that U(a;h) = S(a), hence a2(F y)  aFB
if and only if F y  h. Application of the envelope theorem reveals that the
individuals expected second-period utility is decreasing in the second-period ne,
dU(a2(F
y);F y)=dF y =  a2(F y).
In period t = 1, the individual chooses his activity level a1 2 [0; 1] in order to
maximize his overall expected utility,
EU(a1) = U(a1;F
0) + a1  U(a2(F 1);F 1) + (1  a1)  U(a2(F 0);F 0); (4)
which is strictly concave, d2EU(a1)=d(a1)2 = b00(a1) < 0. In consequence, if
dEU(a1)=da1 ja1=1 =  F 0+U(a2(F 1);F 1) U(a2(F 0);F 0) > 0, then the optimal
rst-period activity level is a1(F 0; F 1) = 1. If dEU(a1)=da1 ja1=1  0, the optimal
rst-period activity level is characterized by the rst-order condition
b0(a1(F 0; F 1)) = F 0 + U(a2(F 0);F 0)  U(a2(F 1);F 1): (5)
In the latter case, application of the envelope theorem yields that the individuals
activity level is strictly decreasing in both the ne for rst-time o¤enders and the
ne for repeat o¤enders, @a1(F 0; F 1)=@F 0 = (1  a2(F 0))=b00(a1(F 0; F 1)) < 0 and
@a1(F
0; F 1)=@F 1 = a2(F
1)=b00(a1(F 0; F 1)) < 0.
Anticipating the individuals behavior, the lawmakers problem at date t = 0
amounts to setting nes F 0  l and F 1 in order to maximize the expected welfare
W (F 0; F 1) := S(a1(F
0; F 1)) + a1(F
0; F 1)  S(a2(F 1))
+ (1  a1(F 0; F 1))  S(a2(F 0)): (6)
Making use of (3) and (5), the partial derivatives of the expected welfare are given
by
@W (F 0; F 1)
@F 0
=
@a1(F
0; F 1)
@F 0

(F 0   h)(1  a2(F 0)) + (F 1   h)a2(F 1))

+(1  a1(F 0; F 1))  [F 0   h]  da2(F
0)
dF 0
(7)
and
@W (F 0; F 1)
@F 1
=
@a1(F
0; F 1)
@F 1

(F 0   h)(1  a2(F 0)) + (F 1   h)a2(F 1))

+a1(F
0; F 1)  [F 1   h]  da2(F
1)
dF 1
: (8)
We now characterize the penalties F 0

and F 1

that the lawmaker will stipulate
at date t = 0.
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Proposition 1. If l  h, the lawmaker sets F 0 = F 1 = h.
When the lawmaker sets F 0 = F 1 = h, then in the second period the individual
will exert the socially desirable activity level a2(h) = aFB irrespective of his o¤ense
history. Since his second-period utility does not depend on his o¤ense history,
according to (5) the individuals rst-period activity level is purely determined
by the ne F 0 = h for rst-time o¤enders, so the individual chooses the socially
desirable activity level also in the rst period, a1(h; h) = aFB.
Now consider the case in which the restriction on penalties for rst-time of-
fenders becomes relevant. We rst establish that repeat o¤enders are punished at
least as hard as rst-time o¤enders; i.e., decreasing punishment schemes are never
optimal.
Lemma 1. If l < h, the lawmaker sets F 0  F 1.
Note that harsher punishment of repeat o¤enders implies that U(a2(F 0);F 0)
 U(a2(F 1);F 1). Hence, the individuals rst-period activity is characterized by
(5), such that @a1(F 0; F 1)=@F y < 0 for y 2 f0; 1g. Moreover, with lima!1 b0(a) =
0, U(a;F ) is bounded from above, such that lima!0 b0(a) = 1 implies that
a1(F
0; F 1) > 0 must hold.
Next, Lemma 1, (7), and (8) imply that whenever 0 < l < h, optimal
sentencing requires F 1

> h and thus overdeterrence of repeat o¤enders, i.e.,
a2(F
1) < aFB. The prospect of a larger ne that the individual may have to pay
in the future helps to deter him from choosing an overly large activity level in the
present.10
Proposition 2. (i) If l 2 (0; h), the lawmaker sets F 1 > h.
(ii) If l = 0, she sets F 1

= h.
Finally, observe that the lawmaker optimally imposes maximum punishment
for rst-time o¤enders.
10Note that if l = 0, the indirect e¤ect of the second-period prospects on the rst-period
incentives is already strong enough such that the lawmaker prefers not to make use of overde-
terrence of repeat o¤enders. Intuitively, one might think that when l = 0, then increasing F 1
above h should be welfare-improving. After all, in the second period there would only be a
second-order loss given that y = 1 (and no e¤ect given y = 0), while in the rst period there
would be a rst-order gain. Yet, this reasoning neglects the fact that y = 0 (leading to a smaller
second-period welfare than y = 1) becomes more likely when F 1 is increased (and hence a1 is
reduced).
5
Proposition 3. If l < h, the lawmaker sets F 0 = l.
In what follows, assume that there is a unique interior solution regarding the
choice of F 1. Under the optimal punishment scheme, there is a non-monotonic
relationship between the maximum punishment of rst-time o¤enders and the
optimal punishment of repeat o¤enders.
Corollary 1. There exist l and l with 0 < l < l < h, such that dF
1
dl

l<l
> 0 and
dF 1

dl

l>l
< 0.
Thus, for su¢ ciently large values of l, a relaxation of the restriction on penal-
ties for rst-time o¤enders prompts the lawmaker to reduce the overdeterrence of
repeat o¤enders, since satisfactory incentives in the rst period can now be pro-
vided by relatively large nes for rst-time o¤enders. However, for small values of
l, when society accepts an increase in the penalties for rst-time o¤enders, then
the lawmaker optimally reacts by also increasing the penalties for repeat o¤end-
ers, thus aggravating overdeterrence. This policy allows the lawmaker to uphold
the desirable indirect e¤ect that large nes for repeat o¤enders have for the in-
centives of rst-time o¤enders in the rst period. Our main results are illustrated
in Figures 1 and 2.11
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Figure 1. The optimal ne for repeat o¤enders, F 1

, and the optimal ne for rst-time
o¤enders, F 0

, as functions of the maximum penalty for rst-time o¤enders, l.
11Specically, in the gures b(a) =
p
a  a=2 and h = 1. Hence, aFB  0:11.
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Figure 2. The rst-period activity level is a1(F 0

; F 1

), while the second-period activity
level is a2(F 1

) or a2(F 0

), depending on whether or not the individual was previously convicted.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
Given in the text. 
Proof of Lemma 1.
We proceed by contradiction. First, suppose that F 1 < F 0 and U(a2(F 1)) >
U(a2(F
0)) + F 0 is optimal. Then a1(F 0; F 1) = 1 and a2(F 1) > a2(F 0) > aFB
because F 1 < F 0  l < h. Now consider an increase in the ne for repeat o¤enders
to ~F 1 2 [F 1; F 0]. Clearly a2(F 0) is left unchanged and, as long as ~F 1 is su¢ ciently
close to F 1, also a1(F 0; ~F 1) = a1(F 0; F 1) = 1. Since a2(F 1) > a2( ~F1) > aFB,
S(a2( ~F1)) > S(a2(F
1)), thereby strictly increasing the value of the lawmakers
objective. In consequence, F 1 < F 0 and U(a2(F 1)) > U(a2(F 0)) + F 0 cannot be
optimal.
Next, suppose that F 1 < F 0 and U(a2(F 1))  U(a2(F 0)) + F 0 is optimal.
Since F 1 < F 0  l < h, we have aFB < a2(F 0) < a2(F 1), S(a2(F 1)) < S(a2(F 0)),
and U(a2(F 0); F 0) < U(a2(F 1); F 1). Moreover, a1(F 0; F 1) is characterized by
(5), @a1(F 0; F 1)=@F 1 < 0, and a1(F 0; F 1) > aFB because b0(a1(F 0; F 1)) = F 0 +
U(a2(F
0); F 0)  U(a2(F 1); F 1) < F 0 < h. In consequence, a slight increase in F 1
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increases overall expected total surplus,
@W (F 0; F 1)
@F 1
=
<0 for a1(F 0;F 1)>aFBz }| {
@S(a1(F
0; F 1))
@a1
@a1(F
0; F 1)
@F 1
+
@a1(F
0; F 1)
@F 1

S(a2(F
1))  S(a2(F 0))

+ a1(F
0; F 1)  dS(a2(F
1))
da2| {z }
<0 for a2(F 1)>aFB
da2(F
1)
dF 1
> 0; (9)
contradicting the original choice of nes to be optimal. 
Proof of Proposition 2.
(i) From Lemma 1, in the optimum we must have F 0  F 1. Distinguishing four
di¤erent cases, we proceed by contradiction.
First, suppose that F 0 2 (0; l] and F 1 2 [F 0; h] is optimal. With 0 < F 0  F 1,
we have a1(F 0; F 1) 2 (0; 1), @a1(F 0; F 1)=@F 1 < 0, a2(F 0) 2 (0; 1), and a2(F 1) 2
(0; 1). Then
@W (F 0; F 1)
@F 1
=
<0z }| {
@a1(F
0; F 1)
@F 1
[
<0z }| {
(F 0   h)
>0z }| {
(1  a2(F 0))+
0z }| {
(F 1   h)
>0z }| {
a2(F
1))]
+ a1(F
0; F 1)| {z }
>0
 [F 1   h]| {z }
0
 da2(F
1)
dF 1| {z }
<0
> 0; (10)
which contradicts F 0 2 (0; l] and F 1 2 [F 0; h] to be optimal.
Second, suppose that F 0 = 0 and F 1 2 (0; h) is optimal. With 0 = F 0 < F 1,
we have a1(F 0; F 1) 2 (0; 1), @a1(F 0; F 1)=@F 1 < 0, a2(F 0) = 1, and a2(F 1) 2
(0; 1). Then
@W (F 0; F 1)
@F 1
=
<0z }| {
(F 1   h)[
<0z }| {
@a1(F
0; F 1)
@F 1

>0z }| {
a2(F
1)+
>0z }| {
a1(F
0; F 1) 
<0z }| {
da2(F
1)
dF 1
] > 0;
(11)
which contradicts F 0 = 0 and F 1 2 (0; h] to be optimal.
Third, suppose that F 0 = 0 and F 1 = 0 is optimal. In this case, a1(F 0; F 1) =
a2(F
0) = a2(F
1) = 1 and @a1(F 0; F 1)=@F 1 < 0. Then
@W (F 0; F 1)
@F 1
=
<0z}|{
 h [
<0z }| {
@a1(F
0; F 1)
@F 1
+
<0z }| {
da2(F
1)
dF 1
] > 0; (12)
which contradicts F 0 = F 1 = 0 to be optimal.
8
Finally, suppose that F 0 = 0 and F 1 = h is optimal. With 0 = F 0 < F 1 = h,
we have a1(F 0; F 1) 2 (0; 1), @a1(F 0; F 1)=@F 1 < 0, a2(F 0) = 1, and a2(F 1) 2
(0; 1). While @W (F 0; F 1)=@F 1 = 0, in this case
@W (F 0; F 1)
@F 0
=
<0z}|{
 h 
>0z }| {
(1  a1(F 0; F 1)) 
<0z }| {
da2(F
0)
dF 0
> 0; (13)
which contradicts F 0 = 0 and F 1 = h to be optimal.
(ii) To see that F 1 = h is optimal for l = 0, note that a2(F 0) = a2(0) = 1.
From (8), we have
@W (0; F 1)
@F 1
= (F 1   h)[ @a1(0; F 1)
@F 1| {z }
<0
 a2(F 1)| {z }
>0
+ a1(0; F
1)| {z }
>0
 da2(F
1)
dF 1| {z }
<0
]: (14)
The desired result then follows from the fact that @W (0; F 1)=@F 1 > 0 for F 1 < h
and W (0; F 1)=@F 1 < 0 for F 1 > h. 
Proof of Proposition 3.
If l = 0, then F 0 = l = 0. In the remainder of the proof, we consider l > 0.
First, with F 1 > h by Proposition 2, F 0 = 0 cannot be optimal because in
this case a2(F 0) = 1 and a1(F 0; F 1) < 1 such that
@W (F 0; F 1)
@F 1
= (F 1   h)

@a1(F
0; F 1)
@F 1
 a2(F 1) + a1(F 0; F 1)  da2(F
1)
dF 1

< 0:
(15)
Hence, overall expected total surplus could be increased by reducing F 1, which
makes F 0 = 0 incompatible with optimality.
Next, suppose that 0 < F 0 < l is optimal, i.e., the constraint F 0  l is not
binding in the optimum. Then the optimal values of F 0 and F 1 have to be char-
acterized by the corresponding system of rst-order conditions, i.e., @W (F
0;F 1)
@F 0
= 0
and @W (F
0;F 1)
@F 1
= 0 have to be jointly satised. From (7) and (8), this requires
(1  a1(F 0; F 1))  [F 0   h]  da2(F 0)dF 0
@a1(F 0;F 1)
@F 0
=
a1(F
0; F 1)  [F 1   h]  da2(F 1)
dF 1
@a1(F 0;F 1)
@F 1
; (16)
where a1(F 0; F 1) 2 (0; 1), and da2(F y)=dF y < 0 and @a1(F 0; F 1)=@F y < 0 for
F y 2 fF 0; F 1g. With F 0 < l < h by hypothesis, a necessary condition for (16)
to hold is that F 1 < h. According to Proposition 2, however, F 1 < h cannot be
optimal, which contradicts F 0 < l to be optimal. 
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Proof of Corollary 1.
With F 0

= l the optimal ne for repeat o¤enders is characterized by
@W (l; F 1

)
@F 1
=
@a1(l; F
1)
@F 1

(l   h)(1  a2(l)) + (F 1   h)a2(F 1))

+ a1(l; F
1)  [F 1   h]  da2(F
1)
dF 1
= 0: (17)
Implicit di¤erentiation of (17) with respect to l yields
@2W (l; F 1

)
@(F 1)2
 dF
1
dl
+
@2a1(l; F
1)
@F 1@F 0

(l   h)(1  a2(l)) + (F 1   h)a2(F 1)

+
@a1(l; F
1)
@F 1

(1  a2(l))  da2(l)
dF 0
(l   h)

+
@a1(l; F
1)
@F 0
(F 1
   h)da2(F
1)
dF 1
= 0: (18)
For l = 0 we have a2(0) = 1 and F 1

= h such that (18) becomes
@2W (0; F 1

)
@(F 1)2
 dF
1
dl
+
@a1(0; F
1)
@F 1
 da2(0)
dF 0
 h = 0: (19)
Likewise, for l = h we have F 1

= h such that (18) becomes
@2W (h; F 1

)
@(F 1)2
 dF
1
dl
+ (1  a2(h))  @a1(h; F
1)
@F 1
= 0: (20)
Finally, note that
@2W (l; F 1

)
@(F 1)2
=
@2a1(l; F
1)
@F 1@F 1

(l   h)(1  a2(l)) + (F 1   h)a2(F 1)

+
@a1(l; F
1)
@F 1

@a2(F
1)
@F 1
(F 1
   h) + a2(F 1)

+
@a1(l; F
1)
@F 1
(F 1
   h)@a2(F
1)
@F 1
+ a1(l; F
1)
@a2(F
1)
@F 1
+ a1(l; F
1)(F 1
   h)d
2a2(F
1)
dF 1dF 1
(21)
such that
@2W (0; F 1

)
@(F 1)2
=
@a1(0; F
1)
@F 1
a2(F
1) + a1(0; F
1)
da2(F
1)
dF 1
< 0 (22)
and
@2W (h; F 1

)
@(F 1)2
=
@a1(h; F
1)
@F 1
a2(F
1) + a1(h; F
1)
da2(F
1)
dF 1
< 0: (23)
Combining (19) and (22) reveals that dF 1

=dljl=0 > 0. Likewise, combining (20)
and (23) yields dF 1

=dljl=h < 0. The results stated in the corollary then follow
from continuity. 
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